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Abstract
We argue that the relationship between managerial pay-for-performance incentives
and risk taking is pro-cyclical. We study the relationship between incentives pro-
vided by stock-based compensation and firm risk for US non-financial corporations
over the two business cycles between 1992 and 2009. We show that a given level of
pay-for-performance incentives results in significantly lower firm risk when the
economy is in a downturn. The documented pro-cyclical relationship between incen-
tives and risk taking is consistent with state-dependent risk aversion. Our findings
contribute to the literature on the depressive effects of performance incentives
on firm risk by documenting the importance of the interaction between performance
incentives and risk aversion.
JEL classification: G01, G3, M52
1. Introduction
A significant portion of executive pay packages are in the form of equity-based compensa-
tion, which create pay-for-performance sensitivity and is expected to incentivize managers
to exert effort and take actions that increase stock values. However, the relationship be-
tween pay-for-performance incentives and firm risk is less clear. Pay-for-performance could
induce more risk taking because risky projects generally create more value and therefore in-
crease the expected value of incentive compensation. However, it could also induce less risk
taking because of a desire to limit portfolio risk. This is mainly because managers are
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inherently more risk averse than diversified shareholders due to their organization-specific
human capital and/or undiversified wealth portfolios (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Smith and
Stulz, 1985; Tufano, 1996).
Despite the well-developed theoretical literature stressing the depressive effects of man-
agerial performance incentives on risk taking, the number of empirical papers testing this
argument remains limited. Although existing studies have focused primarily on the vari-
ation in incentive compensation, it is a combination of incentive compensation and man-
agerial risk aversion that should impact the relationship between performance incentives
and firm risk. In this article, we test the theory exploiting the variation in both incentive
compensation and managerial risk aversion. There is growing evidence illustrating that the
individual risk aversion coefficients increase during recessions (Cohn et al., 2015; Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales, 2014). In addition, managerial wealth is expected to decrease dur-
ing recessions (Davis and von Wachter, 2011; Farber, 2011; Guvenen, Ozkan, and Song,
2014). Both the increase in risk aversion coefficients and the decrease in managerial wealth
are expected to translate into lower risk appetite for a given level of performance incentives.
Therefore, we propose and test a joint hypothesis that managerial risk aversion increases
during recessions and that the increase in risk aversion leads to a weaker relationship be-
tween managerial performance incentives and risk taking.
In order to test this hypothesis, we assemble a panel dataset on executive compensation of
the chief executive officers (CEOs) of the US public firms between 1992 and 2009, a period
that covers two macroeconomic recessions as determined by the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER). We calculate the CEO performance incentives provided by stock
and stock option grants, which amount on average to 37% of a CEO’s pay during our sample
period. We measure the sensitivity of a CEO’s wealth to firm performance with delta—the
change in the dollar value of a CEO’s wealth for a one percentage point change in the stock
price (Core and Guay, 2002). We also control for risk-taking incentives provided to the man-
agers through stock option compensation. We measure risk-taking incentives by vega—the
change in the dollar value of a CEO’s wealth for a 0.01 change in the annualized standard de-
viation of stock returns (Core and Guay, 1999; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006).
Using the business cycle dates identified by the NBER, we show that the relationship be-
tween pay-for-performance incentives and firm risk is positive during economic expansions.
However, we observe no significant relationship between pay-for-performance incentives
and firm risk during recessions. To state the impact of the recession periods in economic
terms, we calculate the effect of increasing a CEO’s delta from its 25th percentile value
($49,000) to its 75th percentile value ($403,000). Such an increase in CEO incentives is
associated with a 16% increase in firm risk during the expansionary periods, while it has
virtually no effect on firm risk during the recession periods. This result is robust to using al-
ternative measures of macroeconomic state as well as to estimation with instrumental vari-
ables and simultaneous equation regressions to account for the endogenous nature of
compensations contracts (Murphy, 2012).
Anecdotal evidence supports our finding that managers tend to take actions that reduce
risk upon entering a recession. The 2009 McKinsey Global Survey has documented that
companies responded to the recession by reducing their investments in risky research and
development (R&D) projects.1 Forty-two percent of the survey respondents said their firms
1 “R&D in the downturn: McKinsey Global Survey Results” available at http://www.mckinsey.com/in
sights/operations/r_and_ampd_in_the_downturn_mckinsey_global_survey_results.
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cut R&D costs, with a large majority shifting their focus to shorter-term and lower-risk
projects. The effects of the shift in the R&D composition were expected to be long-lived—a
significant share of executives said that they expected these R&D cuts to have adverse ef-
fects in the coming 3–5 years.
The weaker relationship between pay-for-performance incentives and firm risk during
recessions may not be related to the underlying macroeconomic environment per se, but to
the general declines in firm values that accompany the recessions. If the impact of macro-
economic state disappears once we control for firm value declines, then the results we pre-
sent are merely an artifact of decreasing stock values during recessions and would
undermine our hypothesis that delta–risk relationship is pro-cyclical. We alleviate this con-
cern by showing that the delta–risk relationship weakens even for firms that experience
value increases during recessions. This result indicates that the increase in risk aversion co-
efficients during recessions (and not the decline in managerial wealth) is the most likely ex-
planation for the pro-cyclicality of the delta–risk relationship.
The ability of the managers to adjust the firm’s overall risk profile over a short period of
time should vary across firms. Therefore, the paper’s main prediction should be more ap-
plicable when a manager can alter the firm’s risk profile more. Accordingly, we look into
the instances when CEOs have more control over firms’ resources. We focus on two vari-
ables that have been shown to be correlated with managerial control: CEO tenure and
product market competition. Using these measures of managerial control, we show that the
relationship between firm risk and delta weakens more in recessions for firms that are man-
aged by more powerful CEOs.
One may also argue that during recessions, there would be a mechanical increase in ef-
fective financial leverage (therefore in equity risk) as a result of falling stock prices. Even
though the paper studies how the sensitivity of equity risk to pay-for-performance sensitiv-
ity varies with macroeconomic conditions, and not how equity risk varies with macroeco-
nomic conditions, the effect of financial leverage on equity risk might vary with factors
related to pay-for-performance sensitivity. To alleviate this concern, we confirm our find-
ings in a subsample of firms with very low levels of leverage.
We also repeat our analysis using firm-specific risk in order to partially alleviate the con-
cern that the stock return volatility, our measure of firm risk, may be correlated with the
macroeconomic state. We use the residuals from the market model to calculate firm-specific
risk. In line with our total risk results, we find that the relationship between delta and firm-
specific risk weakens as the macroeconomic environment deteriorates.
To summarize, our results provide support for the joint hypothesis that managerial risk
aversion increases during recessions and that the increase in risk aversion leads to a weaker
delta–firm risk relationship. In particular, we infer from our findings that the same manager
with exactly the same level of equity-based compensation facing the same firm characteris-
tics may target a lower (higher) risk level during economic recessions (expansions).
The pro-cyclical relationship between incentives and risk taking is consistent with state-
dependent managerial risk aversion documented in the literature.
Our research contributes to the literature that studies the depressive effects of stock-
based compensation on managerial risk taking. Our research also contributes to a small but
growing literature on the impact of different economic states on risk-taking behavior.
Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) show that mutual fund managers decrease risk during
years marked by negative stock market returns, when “employment risk” dominates “com-
pensation incentives”. Schoar and Zuo (2013) illustrate that managers who start their
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careers in recessions have more conservative management styles throughout their tenures as
CEOs. Similarly, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) find that individuals who have experienced
low stock market returns throughout their lives report lower willingness to take financial
risks using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances from 1960 to 2007. Finally,
DeYoung, Peng, and Yan (2013) show that banks facing stronger (weaker) economic condi-
tions choose more (less) risky business policies. However, none of these studies analyze the
link between performance incentives and firm risk under different economic states. We add
to this literature by incorporating the role of pay-for-performance incentives. To our know-
ledge, we provide the first evidence for the pro-cyclicality of the relationship between man-
agerial pay-for-performance incentives and firm risk. Regulators and compensation
committees, who design compensation structures may find it useful to consider the pro-
cyclical nature of the relationship between performance incentives and firm risk.
2. Hypothesis Development
In this article, we argue that a given level of performance incentive would implement a
lower (higher) firm risk during economic recessions (expansions). We motivate this hypoth-
esis by augmenting the standard principal–agent model of executive compensation with a
state-dependent managerial risk aversion coefficient (Cohn et al., 2015; Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales, 2014) and state-dependent managerial wealth. In the standard principal–
agent models, the contracting problem involves risk neutral shareholders designing com-
pensation schemes for risk averse managers. Managers choose effort levels to attain ex-
pected utility levels that are at least equal to their outside options, thus satisfying their
participation constraints and incentive compatibility constraints. In these models, stock-
based compensation naturally emerges as a part of the optimal compensation contract be-
cause it incentivizes managers to exert effort and increase stock value by creating pay-for-
performance sensitivity (delta). With regards to risk taking, if higher net present value
(NPV) projects are also inherently riskier, then higher performance incentives are expected
to implement higher firm risk.
However, it has long been recognized that the linear payoff structure of stock may in-
duce a sufficiently risk averse manager to reject risky, positive NPV projects and therefore
reduce the riskiness of the firm (Guay, 1999). This is because managers are inherently more
risk averse than diversified shareholders due to their organization-specific human capital
and/or undiversified wealth portfolios (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Smith and Stulz, 1985;
Tufano, 1996). The relationship between performance incentives from stock-based com-
pensation and firm risk is expected to weaken: (i) when managerial wealth declines and/or
(ii) when there is an increase in managerial risk aversion coefficient (Ou-Yang, 2003;
Dittmann and Yu, 2011; Edmans and Gabaix, 2011).
To alleviate the effect of risk aversion, managers are awarded stock options, which pro-
vide risk-taking incentives. As the value of a stock option increases with stock price volatil-
ity, option compensation would provide a risk averse manager an incentive to take on risky
investments (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Haugen and Senbet, 1981; Smith
and Stulz, 1985; Smith and Watts, 1992; Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles, 1993; Gaver and
Gaver, 1993; Core and Guay, 1999; Guay, 1999; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006). Still,
option holdings may not be enough to induce managerial risk taking (Guay, 1999; Ju,
Leland, and Senbet, 2002) and the CEOs may reduce firm risk even in the presence of
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strong risk-taking incentives at times when managerial risk aversion is more pronounced
(Milidonis and Stathopoulos, 2014).
Overall, the theory implies that while more pay-for-performance sensitivity could in-
duce less risk taking because of a desire to limit portfolio risk, it could also encourage more
risk taking because risky projects generally create more value and therefore increase the ex-
pected value of incentive compensation. Thus, the direction of the relationship between
firm risk and pay-for-performance sensitivity can go either way. Two factors that character-
ize the manager’s utility function are critical in determining the relationship: the risk aver-
sion coefficient and the level of wealth.
In this article, we argue that the relationship between firm risk and pay-for-performance
sensitivity will be less positive (or more negative) during recessions as risk aversion is ex-
pected to increase due to two distinct reasons: First, the risk aversion coefficient is expected
to increase during recessions. This increase can be thought of as a shift in the expected util-
ity function of the manager for a given level of wealth. Second, the general decline in stock
prices during recessions may lead to a decline in managerial wealth, thereby increasing the
CEO’s marginal utility of consumption. The wealth effect can be viewed as the manager
moving to a more concave region of his/her utility function, making the executive more sen-
sitive to risk. The wealth effect and the risk aversion coefficient channel work in the same
direction, implying the joint hypothesis that managerial risk aversion increases during re-
cessions and that the increase in risk aversion leads to a weaker delta–risk relationship.
The empirical literature documents an increase (decrease) in the individual risk aversion
coefficients during recessions (expansions). Based on an investor survey and laboratory ex-
periments, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2014) show that individual risk aversion sub-
stantially increased with the onset of the 2008 financial crisis. They attribute the
documented increase in risk aversion to the “fear of large losses” because even those survey
responders who have not incurred financial losses still exhibited a decline in their risk aver-
sion suggesting that actual wealth decline is not the only factor driving the changes in risk
aversion. In another experiment, Cohn et al. (2015) prime financial professionals with
boom and bust scenarios and show that subjects who were primed with a financial bust
were substantially more risk averse than those who were primed with a financial boom.
Since neither the managerial risk aversion parameter nor the total managerial wealth is
observable, we are not able to directly measure the magnitude of the two effects. However,
we note that both channels work in the same direction and suggest a joint hypothesis that
managerial risk aversion increases during recessions and that the increase in risk aversion
leads to a weaker delta–risk relationship. Our empirical tests support this joint hypothesis.
In addition, we show that even those firms whose value increase during recessions experi-
ence a weakening delta–firm risk relationship. This implies that the state-dependent link be-
tween delta and firm risk emerges independent of the wealth effect, as a consequence of the
change in the manager’s risk aversion coefficient.
3. Data
Our sample consists of the US companies that are covered in the Standard and Poor’s
ExecuComp database between fiscal years 1992 and 2009. We exclude financial and utility
firms. We merge the ExecuComp data with financial data from Compustat and with stock
price data from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We require that a firm has 3
years of consecutive financial data and that its stock has been traded for at least 100 days
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in those fiscal years. We convert the all of the dollar-based variables to 1992 dollars using
the GDP deflator.
For each CEO, we get compensation data from ExecuComp. The reporting of compen-
sation variables has changed in ExecuComp following the implementation of FAS 123R for
fiscal years ending after December 15, 2006. We follow Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu (2012)
to perform the necessary modifications to ExecuComp variables during 2006–09. We meas-
ure the sensitivity of a CEO’s wealth from her employment to firm performance with
delta—the change in the dollar value of a CEO’s wealth for a one percentage point change
in the stock price. Mean delta is $531,000. Similarly, we measure the sensitivity of a CEO’s
wealth from her employment to firm risk with vega—the change in the dollar value of a
CEO’s wealth for a 0.01 change in annualized standard deviation of stock returns. Mean
vega is $80,000. We winsorize delta, vega, bonus, and salary at the 1st and 99th percentiles
(Core and Guay, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006). Table I provides the summary
statistics on the compensation variables and firm financial characteristics.
We measure firm risk using realized stock return volatility, which is estimated as the
annualized variance of daily stock returns over a fiscal year (Guay, 1999; Low, 2009;
Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu, 2012). We also calculate firm-specific risk by estimating the
market model using CRSP value-weighted returns as our proxy for the returns of the mar-
ket portfolio. Firm-specific risk is the annualized variance of the residuals. Innovations to a
firm’s stock returns are reactions to news about the firm’s future expected cash flows as a
result of its investment and financing activities. Therefore, higher realized stock return vola-
tility should reflect business decisions that have a larger impact on a firm’s expected cash
flow volatility into the future and provide an adequate measure of firm riskiness.
Alternatively, one can infer firm risk from financial and investment policies such as changes
in capital expenditures, R&D expenditures, leverage or firm diversification, which will af-
fect the volatility of the cash flows into the future. However, many aspects of uncertainty
regarding these policies are unobservable. Realized stock return volatility represents the net
effect of all managerial risk-taking activities, including those that are unobservable, hence
is an appropriate way of capturing firm risk (Low, 2009). Yet, one limitation of our firm
risk measure is that it focuses on equity risk alone although total firm risk also includes the
debt component. Since the data on private and public debt are not readily available, we are
unable to estimate the risk of the firm’s debt, but as standard in the literature, we do control
for the impact of leverage on equity risk.
We use six variables to measure the macroeconomic state. First, we create a recession in-
dicator variable based on the business cycle dates determined by the NBER. The NBER
identified two recessions that coincide with our sample period: March 2001–November
2001 and December 2007–June 2009. If a firm’s fiscal year coincides with an NBER reces-
sion period for at least 90 days, we assign the value one to the recession indicator variable.
The NBER recession indicator takes the value one for 4,098 firm years, corresponding to
18% of our full sample (Table I). As our second measure of the macroeconomic state, we
count the number of days in a firm’s fiscal year that coincide with the NBER recession
dates.
The NBER recession dates may not precisely correspond to the declines in macroeco-
nomic activity. According to the NBER, the “economic activity is typically below normal in
the early stages of an expansion and it sometimes remains so well into the expansion.”
Also, the NBER recession indicator does not capture the degree of macroeconomic down-
turns or expansions. With these concerns, we repeat our analyses using alternative measures
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Table I. Summary statistics
This table presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the analyses. The definition




A. CEO compensation measures
Salary ($000s) 22,906 484 246 304 440 624
Bonus ($000s) 22,906 524 750 59 281 660
Cash compensation ($000) 22,906 1013 923 437 724 1259
Vega ($000s) 22,906 80 144 7 28 84
log(1þVega) 22,906 3.15 1.80 2.05 3.38 4.44
Delta ($000s) 22,906 531 1368 49 140 403
log(1þDelta) 22,906 4.88 2 4 5 6
Tenure as CEO (years) 22,906 8 8 3 6 10
Long tenure 22,906 0.71 0.45 0 1 1
Delta ($–$ sensitivity) 22,906 0.37 0.68 0.06 0.14 0.35
Vega ($–$ sensitivity) 22,906 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.07
B. Risk measures
Total risk 22,906 0.276 0.366 0.092 0.171 0.331
log(Total risk) 22,906 1.726 0.914 2.381 1.764 1.105
Idiosyncratic risk 22,906 0.231 0.307 0.075 0.141 0.276
log(Idiosyncratic risk) 22,906 1.924 0.934 2.590 1.961 1.289
C. Firm financial characteristics
Total assets ($mn.) 22,902 3,799 16,003 281 735 2,235
Net sales ($mn.) 22,897 3,372 10,771 284 768 2,291
Sales growth 20,515 0.07 0.27 0.03 0.06 0.16
Market-to-book ratio 22,891 1.85 1.51 0.95 1.37 2.14
Leverage ratio 22,902 0.21 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.33
R&D expenditures/assets 22,902 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.05
Capital expenditures/assets 22,703 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.08
FAS cost 22,897 0.07 2.84 0.00 0.00 0.02
Surplus cash 22,635 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.08 0.13
Cash/assets 22,897 0.20 0.23 0.03 0.10 0.29
Return on assets (ROA) 20,536 0.06 0.21 0.02 0.07 0.13
Stock return 20,536 0.10 1.09 0.26 0.01 0.26
Total loss carry forward 22,906 0.37 0.48 0 0 1
Value decline 22,472 0.40 0.49 0 0 1
HHI 22,906 324.18 354.85 127 190 362
D. Macroeconomic state measures
Recession dummy 22,906 0.18 0.38 0 0 0
Recession days 22,906 46 105 0 0 0
GDP growth rate 22,906 0.96 2.06 0.50 1.30 2.30
Additions to non-farm payroll 22,906 140 201 201 57 4
Personal expenditure growth rate 22,906 0.32 0.52 0.50 0.20 0.10
Retail sales growth rate 22,906 1.17 0.98 1.40 0.90 0.40
S&P500 volatility 22,906 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
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of macroeconomic conditions that are based on the advance release values of real GDP,
non-farm payroll, personal expenditure, and retail sales growth. Definitions, data sources,
and descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix A and Table AI. Earlier literature shows
that these macroeconomic indicators have a significant effect on the market sentiment
(McQueen and Roley, 1993; Flannery and Protopapadakis, 2002; Boyd, Jagannathan, and
Hu, 2005; Andersen et al., 2007). In Figure 1, we plot the advance release values of real
GDP growth rates together with the official NBER recession dates. We use the unrevised
announcement values of the macroeconomic variables to capture the macroeconomic cli-
mate as perceived by the firms during a fiscal year.
4. Results
4.1 Baseline Model
We use the following empirical specification to test for the relationship between managerial
performance incentives and firm risk:
Firm riski;t ¼ aþ b1Deltai;t1 þ b2Vegai;t1 þ
X
j
cjXi;t þ ei;t: (1)
Our primary measure of firm risk is its stock return volatility and main variable of interest
is delta. Although pay-for-performance is the primary focus of this article, we also control
pay-for-risk sensitivity (vega) that are provided to managers via stock options. This is im-
portant because of the possibility that stock options that managers hold may slide out of
the money during recessions, diminishing the risk-taking incentives of managers. Firm risk,
delta, and vega enter the regressions in their natural logarithm forms. Control variables,
Xi;t, include cash compensation, firm size, market-to-book ratio, research and development
expenditures, capital expenditures, and leverage ratio. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006)



























































































































































Figure 1. Gray-shaded areas represent the recession periods as identified by the NBER.
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and Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012) provide a detailed discussion of these control vari-
ables and their predicted signs in the firm risk equation.
We present the results in Table II. In Column 1, the equation is estimated with industry
fixed effects based on firms’ two-digit SIC codes, controlling for any time-invariant differ-
ences across industries that may contribute to the relationship between CEO incentives and
firm risk. In Column 2, we estimate the equation using firm fixed effects, which control for
time-invariant differences across firms. Firm fixed effects are used to mitigate the concern
that unobservable characteristics might be affecting both the structure of executive compen-
sation and firm risk choices. Finally, in Column 3, we estimate the equation using fixed ef-
fects for CEO employment spells. To apply this method, we construct a dummy variable
Table II. Performance incentives and risk
This table presents the results for the estimation of Equation (1) in the text. The dependent vari-
able is firm risk, calculated as the logarithm of the annualized variance of the daily stock re-
turns. The main variable of interest is the logarithm of the lagged value of delta, and represents
the managerial performance incentives. The definitions of the rest of the variables are provided
in Appendix A. All regressions control for year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clus-
tered at firm level in regressions that control for industry fixed effects and at manager level in
regressions that control for firm-manager pair fixed effects. P-values are provided in brackets.











1993–2009 1993–2009 1993–2009 1993–2002 1993–2002
Log(Delta1) 0.000 0.014 0.021 0.042 0.015
[0.963] [0.005]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.024]**
Log(Vega1) 0.032 0.051 0.047 0.041 0.001
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.896]
Log(Cash compensation1) 0.087 0.072 0.057 0.100 0.102
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
CEO tenure 0.001 0.003 0.014 0.005 0.002
[0.435] [0.050]* [0.365] [0.002]*** [0.211]
Log(Sales) 0.173 0.151 0.113 0.216 0.188
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Market-to-book 0.012 0.008 0.004 0.016 0.005
[0.067]* [0.162] [0.516] [0.029]** [0.433]
R&D expenditures/assets 1.861 0.234 0.269 1.749 2.030
[0.000]*** [0.084]* [0.073]* [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Capital expenditures/assets 0.337 0.381 0.400 0.908 0.092
[0.034]** [0.005]*** [0.009]*** [0.000]*** [0.637]
Leverage ratio 0.247 0.301 0.402 0.344 0.189
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.008]***
Constant 0.549 0.674 1.011 0.245 0.560
[0.005]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.077]* [0.001]***
N 20,352 20,352 18,184 20,352 20,352
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.549 0.513 0.532 0.378 0.564
Adjusted R-squared 0.547 0.512 0.532 0.374 0.561
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for each unique combination of CEO and firm pairs. This specification, as suggested by
Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013) takes into account the possibility that a given CEO might
be compensated differently in similar firms due to the heterogeneity in unobservable firm
characteristics such as corporate culture. It also alleviates the concern that career concerns
and fear of large losses which affect risk aversion might vary for different managers due to
the heterogeneity in their unobserved characteristics such as outside employment options.
The fixed effects estimations would help alleviate the endogeneity concern that pay-for-per-
formance sensitivity and return volatility might both be correlated with an unobserved firm
or managerial characteristic. However, an additional endogeneity concern in the context of
our study is that the relation between volatility and pay-for-performance sensitivity might
be correlated with some factor related to economic growth. As such, in Section 5.2, we also
estimate the instrumental variables regressions that directly deal with the possibility that
the interaction of delta and the macroeconomic state may be endogenous with respect to
risk taking. All regressions also include year fixed effects to capture systemic variations in
firm risk over time. We cluster the standard errors at the firm-year level.
The results indicate a positive relationship between managerial performance incentives
and firm risk. Based on the estimation using firm-manager fixed effects, increasing man-
agerial performance incentives from its 25th percentile ($49,000) to its 75th percentile
($403,000) is associated with a 15% increase in firm risk.
Our findings also reveal a statistically significant negative relationship between man-
agerial risk-taking incentives (vega) and firm risk. Earlier studies (e.g., Coles, Daniel, and
Naveen, 2006; Low, 2009) find a positive correlation between vega and firm risk. Even
though our emphasis in this article is performance incentives (delta), we briefly investigate
the reason for the difference in our findings with respect to vega. Since we have followed
the specification in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), we attribute the differences in our re-
sults to the different sample periods. In Columns 4 and 5, we estimate the equation for
1992–2002 in order to replicate the analyses in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) and we
obtain a positive coefficient on vega. In a more recent study, Milidonis and Stathopoulos
(2014) also report a significant negative relationship between vega and risk and attribute
the finding to managerial career concerns. Savaser and Şişli-Ciamarra (2014) attribute the
change in the vega–risk relationship to the announcement and implementation of an ac-
counting rule (FAS 123R) that required the expensing of the employee stock options.
4.2 Macroeconomic State, Incentives, and Firm Risk
In order to test our main hypothesis that the positive relationship between firm risk and
managerial performance incentives becomes weaker (stronger) during macroeconomic
downturns (expansions), we augment our baseline model by adding various measures of
macroeconomic state and interacting these measures with performance incentives:
Firm riski;t ¼ aþ b1Deltai;t1 þ b2Vegai;t1 þ d1Macroeconomic Statei;t:
þd2Macroeconomic Statei;t Deltai;t1






The main coefficient of interest belongs to the interaction of the Macroeconomic State with
Delta (d2). Our first two measures for the macroeconomic state are based on the NBER
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business cycle dates. We predict a statistically significant negative value for d2, since we ex-
pect managerial risk aversion to increase during recessions.
The results are presented in Table III. In line with the predictions of our hypothesis, we
obtain a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term for all
specifications. For example, the interaction coefficient (d2) is 0.023 when we use firm-
manager fixed effects (Column 3), meaning that a 1% increase in delta is associated with a
0.023% decrease in firm risk during a recession. To state the economic impact of recession
on the relationship between performance incentives and firm risk, we calculate the impact
of an increase in a CEO’s delta from its 25th percentile to its 75th percentile. Such an in-
crease in performance incentives is associated with a 16% increase in firm risk during ex-
pansions but virtually no increase in risk during recessions. In Columns 4–6 of Table III, we
use the actual number of recession days over a firm’s fiscal year. The results are similar.
Each additional day of recession decreases the effect of delta on firm risk by 0.003%.
We also estimate Equation (2) using the advance release values of growth in seasonally
adjusted real GDP, non-farm payroll employment, personal expenditure, and retail sales.
Since an increase in these measures corresponds to a better macroeconomic state (thus
lower managerial risk aversion), we predict a positive and significant coefficient for their
interactions with Delta (d2). In line with the predictions of our hypothesis, we obtain a stat-
istically significant positive coefficient on the interaction term for all specifications
(Table IV). For brevity, we focus on the specification using the GDP-based measure and
firm-manager fixed effects when discussing our results (Column 3). The coefficient on the
interaction term is 0.009 and statistically significant at the 1% level (Column 3). This coef-
ficient suggests that when the economy is at its highest state during our sample period
(GDP growth measure¼ 4.8%), an increase in managerial performance incentives from its
25th percentile to its 75th percentile would be associated with a 40% increase in firm risk.
On the other hand, when the economy is at its lowest state (GDP growth meas-
ure¼6.1%), the same increase in performance incentives would result in a 30% decline
in firm risk. The results using non-farm payroll, personal consumption expenditure, retail
sales are presented in the remainder of Table IV and are similar.
To summarize, our findings present evidence that the relationship between equity-based
compensation and risk taking depends on the state of the economy. In particular, we infer
that the same manager with exactly the same level of performance incentives (delta) facing
the same firm characteristics may target a lower (higher) risk level during economic reces-
sions (expansions). The documented pro-cyclical relationship between incentives and risk
taking is consistent with state-dependent risk aversion (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales,
2014; Cohn et al., 2015) and support our joint hypothesis that managerial risk aversion in-
creases during recessions and that the increase in risk aversion leads to a weaker relation-
ship between managerial performance incentives and risk taking.
5. Robustness
5.1 Firm-Specific Risk
We repeat our analyses using firm-specific risk as the dependent variable in order to allevi-
ate, at least partially, the concern that the stock return volatility is correlated with the
macroeconomic state. As before, the main coefficient of interest belongs to the interaction
of the Macroeconomic State and Delta (d2), and we predict a negative (positive) d2 when
we use NBER recessions (macrovariables) as the measure of the macroeconomic state.
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Table III. Relationship between managerial performance incentives and firm risk during macro-
economic recessions
This table presents the results for the estimation of Equation (2) in the text. The dependent vari-
able is firm risk, calculated as the logarithm of the annualized variance of the daily stock re-
turns. The main variable of interest is the interaction of logarithm of the lagged value of delta
with the recession measure. The definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix A. All re-
gressions control for year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm level in re-
gressions that control for industry fixed effects and at firm-manager level in regressions that
control for firm-manager pair fixed effects. P-values are provided in brackets. *, **, and ***
mark the 10%, 5%, and 1% statistical significance for the estimated coefficients.



















Log(Delta1) 0.007 0.017 0.023 0.006 0.017 0.023
[0.296] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.320] [0.001]*** [0.000]***
Log(Vega1) 0.031 0.047 0.046 0.032 0.047 0.046
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
NBER recession measure 0.317 0.332 0.283 0.064 0.066 0.054
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Log(Delta1) * Recession
measure
0.040 0.027 0.023 0.007 0.004 0.003
[0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.023]** [0.000]*** [0.006]*** [0.070]*
Log(Vega1) * Recession
measure
0.002 0.013 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000
[0.789] [0.084]* [0.754] [0.972] [0.118] [0.817]
Log(Cash
compensation1)
0.088 0.072 0.058 0.088 0.072 0.058
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
CEO tenure 0.001 0.002 0.014 0.001 0.002 0.014
[0.502] [0.063]* [0.394] [0.495] [0.064]* [0.393]
Log(Sales) 0.172 0.148 0.111 0.172 0.148 0.111
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Market-to-book 0.012 0.008 0.004 0.012 0.009 0.003
[0.072]* [0.144] [0.540] [0.080]* [0.124] [0.592]
R&D expenditures/assets 1.864 0.237 0.274 1.859 0.229 0.270
[0.000]*** [0.076]* [0.067]* [0.000]*** [0.088]* [0.073]*
Capital expenditures/assets 0.346 0.389 0.404 0.344 0.384 0.400
[0.029]** [0.004]*** [0.008]*** [0.030]** [0.005]*** [0.009]***
Debt/assets 0.244 0.296 0.397 0.246 0.299 0.399
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Constant 0.288 0.722 1.036 0.555 0.723 1.033
[0.152] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.006]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
N 20,352 20,352 18,184 20,352 20,352 18,184
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.550 0.515 0.534 0.550 0.515 0.534
Adjusted R-squared 0.548 0.514 0.533 0.548 0.515 0.533
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Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/rof/article-abstract/21/2/911/2670040
by Bilkent University Library (BILK) user
on 27 June 2018
Table IV. Relationship between managerial performance incentives, firm risk and the macroeco-
nomic state
This table presents the results for the estimation of Equation (2) in the text. The dependent vari-
able is firm risk, calculated as the logarithm of the annualized variance of the daily stock re-
turns. The main variable of interest is the interaction of logarithm of the lagged value of delta
with the macroeconomic state measure. The definitions of the variables are provided in
Appendix A. All regressions control for year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered
at firm level in regressions that control for industry fixed effects and at firm-manager level in re-
gressions that control for firm-manager pair fixed effects. P-values are provided in brackets.
*, **, and *** mark the 10%, 5%, and 1% statistical significance for the estimated coefficients.
Macroeconomic
state measured by



















Log(Delta1) 0.013 0.005 0.012 0.016 0.025 0.030
[0.033]** [0.365] [0.063]* [0.016]** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Log(Vega1) 0.031 0.051 0.046 0.032 0.047 0.049
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Macroeconomy 0.123 0.117 0.111 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Log(Delta1) *
Macroeconomic state
0.014 0.009 0.009 0.112 0.075 0.063
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]***
Log(Vega1) *
Macroeconomic state
0.000 0.002 0.000 0.008 0.011 0.013
[0.813] [0.313] [0.880] [0.614] [0.467] [0.439]
Log(Cash compensation1) 0.091 0.075 0.061 0.090 0.075 0.061
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
CEO tenure 0.001 0.002 0.012 0.001 0.002 0.012
[0.516] [0.067]* [0.446] [0.506] [0.055]* [0.432]
Log(Sales) 0.171 0.143 0.106 0.172 0.145 0.109
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Market-to-book 0.013 0.008 0.004 0.012 0.009 0.002
[0.056]* [0.150] [0.543] [0.071]* [0.097]* [0.702]
R&D expenditures/assets 1.861 0.233 0.277 1.853 0.217 0.261
[0.000]*** [0.074]* [0.063]* [0.000]*** [0.096]* [0.077]*
Capital expenditures/assets 0.348 0.381 0.388 0.327 0.351 0.360
[0.028]** [0.005]*** [0.012]** [0.039]** [0.010]*** [0.018]**
Leverage ratio 0.243 0.298 0.396 0.242 0.300 0.399
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Constant 0.236 0.556 0.873 0.573 0.793 1.089
[0.241] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.004]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
N 20,352 20,352 18,184 20,352 20,352 18,184
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.554 0.520 0.539 0.554 0.522 0.541
Adjusted R-squared 0.552 0.519 0.539 0.552 0.521 0.541
(continued)
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In Table V, we summarize the results. Similar to the earlier results, we obtain a negative
and statistically significant coefficient for the interaction terms when use the NBER reces-
sion dates (Columns 1 and 2). For example, the coefficient on the interaction term for the
NBER dummy is 0.041 and indicates that a 1% increase in delta is associated with a
0.041% reduction in firm-specific risk during recessions. Accordingly, an increase in delta
from its 25th percentile to its 75th percentile would be associated with a 10% increase in
firm risk during expansion years but with a 20% decrease in risk during recession years.
We present the findings using the GDP growth rate, additions to non-farm payroll, and per-























Log(Delta1) 0.011 0.020 0.026 0.025 0.030 0.033
[0.085]* [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Log(Vega1) 0.031 0.049 0.047 0.027 0.042 0.044
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Macroeconomy 0.276 0.223 0.184 0.183 0.154 0.121
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Log(Delta1) *
Macroeconomic state
0.036 0.023 0.019 0.022 0.015 0.012
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]***
Log(Vega1) *
Macroeconomic state
0.000 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.002
[1.000] [0.379] [0.923] [0.349] [0.040]** [0.574]
Log(Cash compensation1) 0.089 0.073 0.058 0.090 0.072 0.058
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
CEO tenure 0.001 0.002 0.014 0.001 0.002 0.014
[0.516] [0.055]* [0.377] [0.559] [0.061]* [0.389]
Log(Sales) 0.172 0.148 0.111 0.172 0.147 0.111
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Market-to-book 0.012 0.008 0.004 0.012 0.008 0.004
[0.071]* [0.154] [0.533] [0.079]* [0.161] [0.521]
R&D expenditures/assets 1.865 0.235 0.274 1.868 0.238 0.278
[0.000]*** [0.078]* [0.066]* [0.000]*** [0.071]* [0.061]*
Capital expenditures/assets 0.338 0.371 0.386 0.342 0.372 0.389
[0.034]** [0.007]*** [0.012]** [0.031]** [0.006]*** [0.011]**
Leverage ratio 0.244 0.298 0.399 0.242 0.296 0.399
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Constant 0.648 0.742 1.062 0.176 0.867 1.147
[0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.369] [0.000]*** [0.000]***
N 20,352 20,352 18,184 20,352 20,352 18,184
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.551 0.516 0.535 0.552 0.517 0.535
Adjusted R-squared 0.549 0.515 0.534 0.550 0.516 0.535
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Table V. Relationship between managerial performance incentives, firm-specific risk, and the
macroeconomic state
This table presents the results for the estimation of Equation (3) in the text. The dependent vari-
able is firm-specific (idiosyncatic) risk, calculated as the logarithm of the annualized variance of
residuals from the market model. The main variable of interest is the interaction of logarithm of
the lagged value of delta with the macroeconomic state measure. The definitions of the vari-
ables are provided in Appendix A. All regressions control for year fixed effects. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the firm-manager level. P-values are provided in brackets. *, **, and ***




















Log(Delta1) 0.014 0.013 0.004 0.023 0.016 0.027
[0.016]** [0.021]** [0.544] [0.000]*** [0.005]*** [0.000]***
Log(Vega1) 0.044 0.044 0.045 0.044 0.044 0.042
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Macroeconomy 0.369 0.069 0.113 0.001 0.198 0.131
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Log(Delta1) *
Macroeconomic state
0.041 0.007 0.012 0.102 0.027 0.017
[0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Log(Vega1) *
Macroeconomic state
0.004 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
[0.616] [0.563] [0.723] [0.913] [0.827] [0.520]
Log(Cash compensation1) 0.069 0.069 0.073 0.073 0.069 0.069
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
CEO tenure 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.016
[0.285] [0.283] [0.327] [0.312] [0.259] [0.273]
Log(Sales) 0.125 0.125 0.121 0.123 0.126 0.125
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Market-to-book 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.016
[0.009]*** [0.011]** [0.006]*** [0.011]** [0.007]*** [0.007]***
R&D expenditures/assets 0.348 0.343 0.353 0.336 0.346 0.353
[0.024]** [0.027]** [0.020]** [0.026]** [0.024]** [0.020]**
Capital expenditures/assets 0.334 0.330 0.319 0.302 0.320 0.322
[0.032]** [0.034]** [0.041]** [0.051]* [0.039]** [0.038]**
Leverage ratio 0.431 0.434 0.433 0.435 0.435 0.434
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Constant 0.882 0.880 0.702 0.938 0.895 0.990
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
N 18,184 18,184 18,184 18,184 18,184 18,184
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-manager fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.495 0.495 0.500 0.500 0.495 0.496
Adjusted R-squared 0.494 0.494 0.499 0.499 0.494 0.495
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Columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively. We obtain a positive coefficient on the interactions terms
across all specifications and the estimates are significant at the 1% level.
5.2 Endogeneity
We have two endogeneity concerns specific to this study. First, the relationship between
firm risk and pay-for-performance sensitivity might be correlated with a factor related to
economic growth, and consequently the interaction of delta and the macroeconomic state
may be endogenous with respect to risk taking. Second, the macroeconomic state may have
a direct effect on the value of managerial incentives because during recessions lower stock
prices would lead to a mechanical decrease in performance incentives (delta) for a fixed
amount of stock and stock option holdings. Since, on average, firm risk increases in reces-
sions, the weakening of the delta–risk relationship that we uncover may simply be a conse-
quence of the increase in the value of our dependent variable accompanying the mechanical
decline in the value of delta during recessions. Due to these concerns, we account for the en-
dogenous nature of the incentive contracts using estimation methods specifically designed
to deal with endogeneity—namely instrumental variables and simultaneous equations
estimations.
5.2.a. Instrumental variables regressions
We treat CEO incentives as endogenous and estimate the contract design and risk equations
using two-stage least squares (2SLS). Our choices of instruments for delta and vega are
based on the determinants identified by the previous literature and include surplus cash
(Core and Guay, 1999; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Armstrong and Vashishtha,
2012), tax-loss carry forwards (Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012), and the accounting cost
that public firms incurred by the implementation of FAS 123R (Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu,
2012). We expect these variables only to have an indirect relationship with firm risk
through their effect on equity incentives and the other control variables. We confirm the
econometric validity of these instruments by conducting Hansen’s tests of overidentifying
restrictions (Hansen, 1982). We present the 2SLS results in Table VI.
Surplus cash is a proxy for cash constraints of a firm, which can influence the CEO’s
equity incentives since cash-constrained firms tend to substitute cash compensation with re-
stricted stock and stock options (Core and Guay, 1999). However, the presence (or lack) of
cash constraints by itself does not necessarily imply systematically different levels of firm
risk. Still, one may argue that cash surplus may not be a valid instrument if risky firms keep
a larger cash cushion to avoid financial distress and at the same time provide more equity
incentives to their CEOs in order to deal with the agency problems associated with free
cash flow. However, Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012) present evidence that the results of
the 2SLS regressions are unchanged after removing the variation in cash balances due to
precautionary motives by regressing firms’ cash balance on an index of financial
constraints.
The tax-loss carry forward indicator is a proxy for the firm’s marginal tax rate. Firms
with lower tax rates have more incentive to provide equity-based compensation. This is be-
cause Section 162(m) of the US Internal Revenue Code limits the annual tax deduction to
$1 million for compensation paid to a public company’s CEO and the three highest com-
pensated officers (other than the CFO) but excludes the grants of options and restricted
stock (i.e., sources of delta). We do not expect tax-loss carry forward to have a direct effect
on firm risk.
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Table VI. Endogeneity
This table presents the results for the estimation of Equation (2) and Equation (3) in the text by
two-stage and three-stage least squares. In Columns 1 and 3, the dependent variable is firm
risk, calculated as the logarithm of the annualized variance of the daily stock returns. In
Columns 2 and 4, the dependent variable is firm-specific (idiosyncatic) risk, calculated as the
logarithm of the annualized variance of residuals from the market model. The main variable of
interest is the interaction of logarithm of the lagged value of delta with the macroeconomic
state measure. Macroeconomic state is measured as the real GDP growth rate. The definitions
of the variables are provided in Appendix A. All regressions control for year fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are clustered at firm level in regressions that control for industry fixed
effects and at firm-manager level in regressions that control for firm-manager pair fixed effects.
P-values are provided in brackets. *, **, and *** mark the 10%, 5%, and 1% statistical signifi-
cance for the estimated coefficients.





Log(Delta) 1.198 1.077 0.069 0.102
[0.113] [0.123] [0.087]* [0.018]**
Log(Vega) 1.266 1.168 0.214 0.097
[0.072]* [0.072]* [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Macroeconomy 0.444 0.425 0.109 0.229
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Log(Delta) * Macroeconomic state 0.099 0.094 0.021 0.053
[0.010]*** [0.008]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]***
Log(Vega) * Macroeconomic state 0.042 0.033 0.003 0.010
[0.329] [0.401] [0.353] [0.005]***
Log(Cash compensation) 0.326 0.313 0.013 0.066
[0.020]** [0.017]** [0.409] [0.000]***
CEO tenure 0.068 0.065 0.010 0.001
[0.313] [0.293] [0.000]*** [0.792]
Log(Sales) 0.150 0.157 0.144 0.157
[0.190] [0.162] [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Market-to-book 0.342 0.321 0.024 0.001
[0.099]* [0.094]* [0.042]** [0.951]
R&D expenditures/assets 1.191 1.186 2.326 2.042
[0.089]* [0.070]* [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Capital expenditures/assets 0.042 0.017 0.159 0.303
[0.913] [0.962] [0.112] [0.003]***
Leverage ratio 0.832 0.815 0.256 0.245
[0.023]** [0.017]** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
S&P 500 volatility 0.433 0.240
N 21,832 21,832 22,426 22,426
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen statistics 0.073 0.246
(P-value) 0.9641 0.8843
Note: P-values in brackets.
*P< 0.10.
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With the implementation of FAS123R in 2006, public corporations were required to ex-
pense stock option grants at their fair market values. Our last instrument is the accounting
cost of implementing FAS123R (FAS cost), which is proxied with the ratio of the estimated
market value of annual CEO option grants to reported net income. This ratio measures
how much the reported net income of a firm would decline if stock option grants were
expensed at their fair value. Prior to FAS123R, firms with high accounting costs granted
more options, but following the rule change, these firms reduced stock option grants more
because they would have had a larger accounting impact on their profitability measures
(Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu, 2012). This non-uniform response to the regulation implies a
positive relationship between vega and accounting cost of FAS 123R. However, we do not
expect FAS cost to affect firm risk. In fact, Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu (2012) show that the
passage of FAS 123R has not been accompanied by a similar decline in firm risk.
A concern in the context of our study is that the interaction of delta and the macroeco-
nomic state may be endogenous with respect to risk taking. The 2SLS estimation is also
helpful in alleviating this additional endogeneity concern because the interactions of en-
dogenous variables with an exogenous variable are treated as endogenous in the estimation.
The interactions of instruments for the endogenous variables with the exogenous variable
serve as valid instruments (Bun and Harrison, 2014; Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 121–122).
Therefore, aside from delta and vega, we also treat the interactions of delta and vega with
the macroeconomic state measure as endogenous in our first-stage regressions.
Additionally, we include the interactions of the surplus cash, tax-loss carry forward indica-
tor, and the FAS cost with the macroeconomic state measure in our list of instruments.
The instrumental variable estimation involves 2SLS method, where we first regress delta
and vega on the instruments and the exogenous controls. Then, we regress the total firm
risk on the predicted values of delta and vega. Our first-stage regression results are in line
with the prior research (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Armstrong and Vashishtha,
2012).2 We conduct the Hansen’s test of overidentifying restrictions to see whether the ex-
clusion restriction holds. We find that the J-statistics associated with the test are statistically
insignificant at the 10% level. Therefore, the assumption that the instruments are exogen-
ous is unlikely to be violated. In addition, the partial F-statistics suggest that as a group,
our instruments have a significant explanatory power in both the delta and vega regressions
at the 1% level and confirm that our results are not subject to the weak instrument bias.
In Columns 1 and 2 of Table VI, we present the second-stage results. We find a statistic-
ally significant positive coefficient on delta and its interaction term with GDP growth vari-
able. The 2SLS estimation results confirm the robustness of our main finding to the
endogenous treatment of contract design, as well as the endogeneity of the interaction of
delta and the macroeconomic state with respect to risk taking.
5.2.b. Simultaneous equations regressions
We also estimate firm risk, delta, and vega in a simultaneous regression framework in order
to address the concern that the executive compensation contracts and firm risk might be
jointly determined. We follow the same specification as in the instrumental variables esti-
mation for delta and vega. Simultaneous equations require an additional variable in each
equation that is unique to that equation for identification. For delta and vega equations, we
use the median delta and vega values in the firm’s industry since compensation structures
2 Unreported for brevity. Available upon request.
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vary across industries. For firm risk, we include the volatility of the S&P 500 index. All de-
pendent variables in the system are explicitly taken to be endogenous and are treated as cor-
related with the disturbances in the system’s equations. The system is estimated by the 3SLS
method, which is the most efficient estimation technique for the simultaneous systems
(Schmidt, 1976; Greene, 2003).
In Columns 3 and 4 of Table VI, we present the results for interaction of the macroeco-
nomic state with managerial performance incentives for total risk and firm-specific risk
equations respectively. Once again, in line with the predictions of our hypothesis, we obtain
a statistically significant positive coefficient on the interaction terms. These results confirm
the main finding in the article—the relationship between managerial performance incen-
tives and firm risk depends on the underlying macroeconomic state and gets stronger
(weaker) as the economy expands (contracts).
5.3 Firm Value Declines or Macroeconomic State?
The main result in this article may not be related to the underlying macroeconomic environ-
ment per se, but to the general declines in firm values that accompany the recessions. If the
impact of macroeconomic state disappears once we control for firm value declines, then the
results we present are merely an artifact of decreasing stock values during recessions and
would undermine our hypothesis that delta–risk relationship is pro-cyclical. Here, we ad-
dress this concern with additional tests.
We start with investigating whether delta–risk relationship is weaker when firm valu-
ations decrease. To this end, we separate the firms into two subsamples: (i) Firms whose
stock values decline over a fiscal year and (ii) firms whose stock values increase or stay the
same over a fiscal year. We create an indicator variable (Value Decline) that takes the value
one for negative return firms and zero otherwise. We perform a split-sample analysis by
estimating the baseline regression (Equation (1)) for the two groups separately. We then
augment the baseline regression equation by adding the “Value Decline” indicator and its
interactions with delta and vega to formally test whether there is a significant difference in
the relationship between pay-for-performance sensitivity and firm risk when the firm value
declines.
We present the results in Table VII. The results indicate that the firms that experience
value decreases over a fiscal year tend to increase firm risk whereas firms that experience
value increases over a fiscal year tend to decrease firm risk. For firms with declining values,
the coefficient on delta is significant and positive (Column 1), whereas for firms with
increasing values the coefficient on delta is significant and negative (Column 2). The coeffi-
cient on the interaction term (Value Decline * Delta) is 0.031 and significant at the 1%
level (Column 3). This difference-in-difference analysis implies that a 1% increase in delta
is associated with an additional 0.031% increase in firm risk for firms that experience de-
clines in their stock valuations compared with firms whose values do not decrease.
This finding is counterintuitive because the theory predicts that a reduction in a firm’s
stock price would have a depressive effect on the manager’s risk-taking incentives. A pos-
sible explanation might be related to how managers are evaluated for their performance—
managers are assessed annually and respond to the changes in firm performance regardless
of their incentives. In response to poor midyear performance, increasing risk may increase
the chance of catching up with the peers (Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996; Kempf,
Ruenzi, and Thiele, 2009), hence contrary to the theoretical prediction, managers of firms
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Table VII. Effect of macroeconomic environment versus firm values
This table presents the results for the estimation of Equation (1) and Equation (2) in the text for
firms with declining and increasing valuations. The dependent variable is firm risk, calculated
as the logarithm of the annualized variance of the daily stock returns. The main variables of
interest is the interaction of logarithm of the lagged value of delta with the value decline indica-
tor (Column 3), and the interaction of logarithm of the lagged value of delta with the NBER re-
cession dummy and value decline indicator (Column 6). The definitions of the variables are
provided in Appendix A. All regressions control for year fixed effects. Robust standard errors
are clustered at year-firm level. P-values are provided in brackets. *, **, and *** mark the 10%,
5%, and 1% statistical significance for the estimated coefficients.

















Log(Delta1) 0.024 0.028 0.023 0.042 0.004 0.008
[0.042]** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.539] [0.189]
Log(Vega1) 0.052 0.040 0.056 0.046 0.040 0.050
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Negative return 0.087 0.100
[0.009]*** [0.003]***
Log(Delta1) * Value decline 0.031 0.019
[0.000]*** [0.005]***
Log(Vega1) * Value decline 0.027 0.024
[0.000]*** [0.000]***
NBER recession dummy 1.080 1.131 1.078
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Log(Delta1) * Recession 0.050 0.082 0.075
[0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Log(Vega1) * Recession 0.019 0.000 0.001
[0.182] [0.971] [0.906]
Value decline * Recession 0.028
[0.707]








Log(Cash compensation1) 0.011 0.076 0.050 0.085 0.122 0.106
[0.692] [0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
CEO tenure 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
[0.045]** [0.095]* [0.009]*** [0.189] [0.115] [0.047]**
Log(Sales) 0.057 0.080 0.062 0.127 0.130 0.125
[0.065]* [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Market-to-book 0.100 0.077 0.033 0.041 0.114 0.070
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.053]* [0.000]*** [0.000]***
R&D expenditures/assets 0.520 0.477 0.415 0.234 0.100 0.181
[0.032]** [0.137] [0.032]** [0.249] [0.750] [0.288]
Capital expenditures/assets 0.016 1.185 0.573 0.309 0.628 0.153
[0.961] [0.000]*** [0.006]*** [0.264] [0.003]*** [0.395]
Debt/assets 0.690 0.696 0.668 0.541 0.600 0.554
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
(continued)
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Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/rof/article-abstract/21/2/911/2670040
by Bilkent University Library (BILK) user
on 27 June 2018
that experience stock price declines may choose to increase firm risk instead of reducing it.
This finding might also be related to the fact that the wealth effect is particularly difficult to
capture due to the variations in CEOs’ outside wealth, which we cannot directly measure in
the US setting because of lack of data. Neyland (2012) gets around this problem by using
spousal divorce as a proxy for a negative shock to a CEO’s outside wealth. He finds that
firm risk decreases during the years of spousal divorce and attributes this result to the in-
crease in managerial risk aversion as a response to the decline in the wealth of the execu-
tives following divorce.
Next, we look at firm value effects during recessions. We note that during recessions,
2,120 firms in our sample experienced value declines, and 1,978 firms experienced value in-
creases. Therefore, we have variation in firm performance during fiscal years that coincide
with NBER recession dates. If the main result we present in the article is solely related to
declines in firm values and not related to the macroenvironment, then the weakening of
delta–risk relation should only be valid for firms that experience a decrease in value and
not for firms whose value increase during recessions. To explore this possibility, in
Columns 4 and 5, we perform a split-sample analysis by estimating Equation (2) for the
two groups separately, and in Column 6, we augment our main regression equation
(Equation (2)) by adding the negative return dummy and its interactions with delta, vega,
and the recession indicator along with the triple interaction term (Delta * Value
Decline * Recession). This specification enables us to distinguish between firms whose val-
ues decrease in recessions and firms whose values increase during recessions.
The results show that the effect of delta on firm risk is negative during recessions for
both types of firms (Columns 4 and 5). It is especially reassuring to see that the delta–risk
relationship weakens even for firms that experience value increases during recessions
(Column 5). Finally, we find that the coefficient on the triple interaction term is insignifi-
cant at the 10% level (Column 6).3 Recessions seem to have a significant effect on risk-tak-
ing decisions regardless of the direction of firm value changes. These results are robust to
Table VII. Continued

















Constant 0.954 0.838 0.985 0.375 0.548 0.550
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.110] [0.001]*** [0.000]***
N 8,127 11,687 19,814 8,127 11,687 19,814
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-manager fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.033 0.065 0.088 0.230 0.252 0.271
Adjusted R-squared 0.031 0.065 0.087 0.228 0.251 0.270
Note: P-values in brackets.
*P< 0.10, **P< 0.05, ***P< 0.01.
3 This finding is also in line with Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2014), who show that even the people
who do not face any financial losses exhibit higher levels of risk aversion during recessions.
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employing the continuous measures of macroeconomic state instead of the recession indica-
tor and also to using firm-specific risk as the dependent variable. We also repeat the ana-
lyses using declines in firm values that are orthogonal to macroeconomic conditions and
obtain the same results.
The finding that the delta–risk relationship responds similarly to macroeconomic reces-
sions regardless of whether the firm’s stock price increases or decreases during the recession
suggests that a shift in risk aversion is the most likely explanation of our main result. In
addition, the main finding in the article is not valid for those firms that operate in reces-
sion-proof industries.4 This result is in line with our main hypothesis because managers in
recession-proof industries would not expect recessions to impact their firms significantly,
hence their risk aversion would be less sensitive to the underlying macroeconomic
environment.
5.4 CEO Control
The main source of pro-cyclicality between delta and firm risk that we document in this art-
icle is the agency problem caused by the differences in risk attitudes of managers and share-
holders. Such an agency problem would be more pronounced when a manager has more
control over the firm’s resources. These managers will be able to influence firms’ business
decisions to a greater extent and therefore affect firm risk more. Hence, in this section, we
focus on two variables that are correlated with managerial control: CEO tenure and prod-
uct market competition.
CEO tenure has been widely used as a proxy for CEO control in the literature (e.g., in
Fahlenbrach, 2009; Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer, 2010; Chava, Kumar, and Warga,
2010; Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo, 2011; Agrawal and Nasser, 2012). Boards’ control
over a CEOs’ actions are expected to decline as CEOs become more seasoned in the firm.
Baker and Gompers (2003) show that the representation of independent outsiders on the
board decreases with the tenure of the CEO. A CEO with a longer tenure is also more likely
to capture the board of directors because directors that are appointed by a CEO exert less
control over him/her (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Baker and Gompers, 2003; Morse,
Nanda, and Seru, 2011; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2014). Coles, Daniel, and Naveen
(2014) develop a measure of “board co-option”—the percentage of the board members
that are appointed during a CEOs tenure and show that board co-option increases with ten-
ure, while the monitoring effectiveness of the board of directors decreases with co-option.5
As boards’ monitoring effectiveness decline, the CEOs would have a larger effect over com-
pany policies and therefore exert more control over firm risk. For instance, CEOs influence
R&D spending to suit their own preferences as their tenure increase (Baker and Mueller,
2002). Similarly, more seasoned CEOs (with a tenure exceeding 3 years) tend to have more
power over the board of directors (Pan, Wang, and Weisbach, 2014) and the CEO tenure
effect exists regardless of the macroeconomic conditions or the industry conditions in which
the CEO takes office.
4 Recession proof industries are oil and gas, food manufacturing, beverage, tobacco, mining, utilities,
and healthcare. These are the industries that are characterized with market betas that are lower
than 1 (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). Results are available upon request.
5 We also find that CEOs that are monitored by more co-opted boards are more able to decrease
firm risk during recessions. We thank Lalitha Naveen for sharing the board co-option data with us.
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We divide the firms into two subsamples: (i) firms whose CEOs have a tenure exceeding
3 years and (ii) firms whose CEOs have a tenure less than or equal to 3 years. We create a
dummy variable that takes the value one for firms that are managed by long-tenured CEOs
and zero otherwise. We test whether the delta–risk relationship is weaker during recessions
for firms with more seasoned CEOs. In line with our prediction, we find that the effect of
delta on firm risk during recessions is significantly negative for those firms with seasoned
CEOs (Table VIII, Column 1). Although the coefficient is also negative for firms with short
tenured CEOs, the effect is statistically insignificant at the 10% level. The coefficient on the
triple interaction term is negative (0.045) and significant at the 10% level (Column 3)
implying that firms with seasoned CEOs tend to reduce firm risk during recessions more
compared with those firms that are run by short tenure CEOs.
Product market competition acts as an important external governance device that limits
the managers’ ability to use firms’ resources according to their own personal preferences. In
fact, there is evidence that product market competition may be a substitute for internal gov-
ernance mechanisms (Giroud and Mueller, 2010; Chhaochharia et al., 2012). The recent
empirical literature indicates that product market competition reduces managerial indiscip-
line (Giroud and Mueller, 2010, 2011; Grullon and Michaely, 2012) and improves manage-
ment practices (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007; Bloom
et al., 2015) show that product market competition is a disciplinary force on managers,
leading to higher corporate payouts. As these studies show, high product market competi-
tion tends to be a disciplining force on managers. Therefore, we expect these managers to
be less able to adjust firms’ operations to alter firm risk according to their own preferences.
To identify the instances of low product market competition, we use the Herfindahl–
Hirschman index (HHI) of industry concentration developed by Hoberg and Phillips
(2014) based on a group of competitor companies determined by pairwise similarity scores
of product descriptions reported in 10-K reports. Overall, high HHI scores indicate lower
product market competition and we expect the delta–risk relationship to be more sensitive
to the changes in the macroeconomic environment in firms with lower HHI scores.6 We
divide the firms into two subsamples according to their HHIs: (i) firms whose HHI scores
are above the sample median and (ii) firms whose HHI scores are less than or equal to the
median. We create an indicator variable that takes the value one for high HHI firms and
zero otherwise. We perform a split-sample analysis by running Equation (2) for the two
groups separately. The effect of delta on firm risk during recessions is significantly negative
for firms that face limited product market competition (Table VIII, Column 4). The coeffi-
cient for firms that face significant product market competition is statistically insignificant
at the 10% level. We also augment the regression equation by adding the high HHI dummy,
its interactions with delta, vega, the recession indicator along with the triple interaction
term (Delta * high HHI * recession). The coefficient on the triple interaction term is nega-
tive (0.041) and significant at the 1% level (Column 6) implying that firms that face less
competition tend to reduce firm risk more during recessions in response to a given level of
delta compared with those firms that operate in a more competitive environment.
Overall, our analyses based on CEO tenure and product market competition as proxies
for CEO power suggest that the delta–risk relationship becomes more sensitive to the
6 We also check our results using the product market fluidity index that measures the emerging
product market threats from other firms (Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala, 2014) as an alternative
measure for product market competition. Results are unchanged.
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Table VIII. Managerial control
This table presents the results for the estimation of Equation (2) in the text for firms with higher
and lower levels of managerial control. The dependent variable is firm risk, calculated as the
logarithm of the annualized variance of the daily stock returns. Managerial control is proxied by
CEO tenure in Columns 1–3 and by HHI in columns. The main variables of interest are the inter-
actions of logarithm of the lagged value of delta with the NBER recession dummy and man-
agerial control measures (Columns 3, 6, and 9). The definitions of the variables are provided in
Appendix A. All regressions control for year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered
at firm level. P-values are provided in brackets. *, **, and *** mark the 10%, 5%, and 1% statis-
















Log(Delta1) 0.022 0.038 0.037 0.018 0.029 0.027
[0.000]*** [0.077]* [0.000]*** [0.035]** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Log(Vega1) 0.047 0.049 0.055 0.050 0.044 0.052
[0.000]*** [0.023]** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
NBER recession dummy 0.269 0.238 0.198 0.296 0.204 0.162
[0.000]*** [0.166] [0.035]** [0.000]*** [0.016]** [0.019]**
Log(Delta1) * Recession 0.020 0.023 0.019 0.037 0.003 0.001
[0.037]** [0.603] [0.446] [0.003]*** [0.804] [0.957]
Log(Vega1) * Recession 0.004 0.039 0.055 0.011 0.009 0.004
[0.638] [0.382] [0.013]** [0.350] [0.409] [0.668]
Managerial control 0.070 0.028
[0.037]** [0.397]
Managerial control * Recession 0.099 0.214
[0.304] [0.008]***




Log(Delta1) * Managerial control 0.017 0.042
[0.095]* [0.011]**
Log(Vega1) * Managerial control 0.009 0.014
[0.349] [0.039]**




Log(Cash compensation1) 0.055 0.050 0.060 0.086 0.033 0.057
[0.000]*** [0.136] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.022]** [0.000]***
CEO tenure 0.012 0.067 0.012 0.008 0.017 0.013
[0.189] [0.001]*** [0.185] [0.692] [0.125] [0.133]
Log(Sales) 0.101 0.187 0.106 0.131 0.095 0.109
[0.000]*** [0.011]** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Market-to-book 0.006 0.055 0.004 0.025 0.004 0.004
[0.210] [0.001]*** [0.394] [0.003]*** [0.550] [0.407]
R&D expenditures/assets 0.282 0.110 0.284 0.088 0.321 0.272
[0.021]** [0.795] [0.009]*** [0.521] [0.021]** [0.012]**
Capital expenditures/assets 0.339 0.003 0.402 0.486 0.402 0.396
[0.007]*** [0.994] [0.000]*** [0.018]** [0.005]*** [0.000]***
Debt/assets 0.409 0.287 0.396 0.368 0.401 0.397
[0.000]*** [0.121] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Constant 1.111 0.141 1.089 0.718 1.264 1.058
[0.000]*** [0.785] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
N 14,648 3,536 18,184 8,054 10,130 18,184
R-squared 0.526 0.415 0.535 0.533 0.557 0.535
Adjusted R-squared 0.525 0.410 0.534 0.531 0.556 0.534
Note: P-values in brackets.
*P< 0.10, **P< 0.05, ***P< 0.01.
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underlying macroeconomic environment when managers have more control over firm poli-
cies. When there is less discipline imposed by internal and/or external governance sources,
CEOs can have a strong influence over firm risk and hence can reduce firm risk during re-
cessions more in response to a given level of delta compared with firms that are run by less
powerful CEOs.
5.5 Dollar–Dollar Measure
As standard in the literature (Core, 1999; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Low, 2009),
we use the dollar-percentage measure of pay-for-performance sensitivity (i.e., dollar change
in CEO wealth for a 1% change in the stock price). However, we recognize that the macro-
economic conditions may have a mechanical impact on the value of performance incentives.
A 1% increase in stock price would automatically lead to a larger increase in the dollar
value of performance incentives during expansions to the extent that stock prices are
higher. To illustrate with an example, let’s consider a CEO that holds 1,000 units of her
firm’s stock. If the price of the stock is $10, a 1% increase in stock price will increase the
CEO’s firm-related wealth by $100. If on the other hand, the stock value increases to $20
due to a positive macroeconomic environment, then a 1% increase in stock price will in-
crease the CEO’s wealth by $200. As this simple example illustrates, the dollar-percentage
measure is positively related to the macroeconomic conditions due to the higher stock pri-
ces during macroeconomic expansions.
To address this concern, we have included the macroeconomic state as an explanatory
variable in both the delta and vega equations when we conducted instrumental variables
and simultaneous equations estimations. Here, we provide an additional robustness check.
We calculate the dollar–dollar measure of delta (i.e., the dollar increase in CEO wealth as a
result of a dollar increase in stock price) and use it in our regressions instead of the dollar-
percentage measure. The dollar–dollar measure of performance incentives is not sensitive to
the level of the underlying stock price, and therefore is not impacted by the underlying
macroeconomic conditions. We present the results using the dollar–dollar sensitivity in
Table IX. Our results remain unchanged.
5.6 Clustering of Standard Errors
Throughout the article, we cluster the standard errors at the firm level, allowing the residuals
of a given firm to be correlated across years. In the context of this study, the error terms are
also possibly cross-sectionally correlated since macroeconomic recessions are likely to affect
all firms, albeit differently. With only a few recessions, the number of truly independent ob-
servations may be small, resulting in under-estimation of the standard errors.
Ideally, we would cluster the standard errors both at the firm level and at the year level,
using two-way clustering as suggested by Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011). However,
we do not have sufficient number of observations to cluster on both dimensions. As an al-
ternative, we have re-estimated Equation (3) by clustering standard errors at the industry-
year level. This approach would partially alleviate the concern for cross-sectional correl-
ation in the error terms, because the most obvious driver of clustering is the cross-sectional
correlation in firm volatilities among firms in the same industry, since recessions are likely
to affect firms in different industries differently.
7
Our results are robust to this alternative
form of clustering.
7 We thank the referee for this suggestion.
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Table IX. Dollar–dollar sensitivity as a measure for managerial performance incentives
This table presents the results for the estimation of Equation (2) in the text. The dependent vari-
able is firm risk, calculated as the logarithm of the annualized variance of the daily stock re-
turns. Delta in these regressions is measured as the dollar increase in CEO wealth as a result of
a dollar increase in stock price. The main variable of interest is the interaction of logarithm of
the lagged value of delta with the macroeconomic state measure. The definitions of the vari-
ables are provided in Appendix A. All regressions control for year fixed effects. Robust standard
errors are clustered at firm level in regressions that control for industry fixed effects and at
firm-manager level in regressions that control for firm-manager pair fixed effects. P-values are
provided in brackets. *, **, and *** mark the 10%, 5%, and 1% statistical significance for the
estimated coefficients.
Macroeconomic
state is measured by:



















Log(Delta1) 0.0024 0.0144 0.0201 0.009 0.012 0.018
[0.507] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.013]** [0.003]*** [0.000]***
Log(Vega1) 0.0320 0.0480 0.0440 0.030 0.051 0.048
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Macroeconomy 0.1596 0.2075 0.2072 0.077 0.076 0.079
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Log(Delta1) *
Macroeconomic state
0.1492 0.1145 0.1245 0.058 0.025 0.029
[0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]***
Log(Vega1) *
Macroeconomic state
0.3078 0.4927 0.4636 0.056 0.057 0.038
[0.088]* [0.002]*** [0.007]*** [0.108] [0.062]* [0.216]
Log(Cash compensation1) 0.0892 0.0741 0.0594 0.088 0.073 0.059
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
CEO tenure 0.0006 0.0021 0.0130 0.001 0.002 0.013
[0.331] [0.009]*** [0.141] [0.087]* [0.002]*** [0.146]
Log(Sales) 0.1762 0.1555 0.1183 0.165 0.145 0.106
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Market-to-book 0.0137 0.0073 0.0041 0.010 0.009 0.003
[0.000]*** [0.074]* [0.374] [0.011]** [0.028]** [0.526]
R&D expenditures/assets 1.8508 0.2409 0.2704 1.872 0.230 0.259
[0.000]*** [0.017]** [0.013]** [0.000]*** [0.024]** [0.018]**
Capital expenditures/assets 0.3308 0.3694 0.3900 0.346 0.375 0.386
[0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]***
Leverage ratio 0.2475 0.3017 0.3997 0.242 0.294 0.390
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Constant 0.4754 0.6430 0.9722 0.161 0.593 0.923
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.128] [0.000]*** [0.000]***
N 20,345 20,345 18,177 20,345 20,345 18,177
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.550 0.514 0.534 0.553 0.517 0.538
Adjusted R-squared 0.548 0.514 0.533 0.551 0.517 0.538
Note: P-values in brackets.
*P< 0.10, **P< 0.05, ***P< 0.01”
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5.7 Financial Leverage
In our analyses, we have shown that the relationship between managerial performance in-
centives and firm risk weakens during economic downturns (and vice versa). However, one
may argue that during recessions, as stock values decline, there will be a mechanical in-
crease in financial leverage. Higher leverage would in turn lead to an automatic increase in
stock return volatility.
Even though the article studies how the sensitivity of equity risk to pay-for-performance
incentives vary with macroeconomic conditions, and not how equity risk varies with
macroeconomic conditions, the effect of financial leverage on equity risk might also vary
with factors related to pay-for-performance sensitivity. To address this concern, we esti-
mate our main regressions (Equation (2)) separately for firms that are in the lowest quartile
of the leverage distribution in our sample.8 These firms have very low financial leverage
ratios: the mean leverage ratio for the firms in the lowest quartile is 0.003, and the median
leverage ratio is zero. A confirmation of our findings for the sample of very low leverage
firms would alleviate the concern that the results we present are merely related to the in-
creases (decreases) in financial leverage during economic recessions (expansions). We pre-
sent the results in Table X. Our results remain unchanged for the sample of low-leverage
firms.
6. Conclusion
In this article, we show that the relationship between performance incentives and firm risk
is sensitive to the underlying macroeconomic environment. Our results suggest that the
same manager with exactly the same level of performance incentives facing the same firm
characteristics may target a lower (higher) risk level during economic recessions (expan-
sions). To our knowledge, we provide the first evidence of the pro-cyclicality of this rela-
tionship, a result that is consistent with the state-dependent nature of individual risk
aversion (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2014); Cohn et al., 2015).
Understanding how similar pay packages are associated with different risk levels under
different economic conditions is crucial for designing compensation packages that yield a
desired level of firm risk over the business cycle. A large set of corporate finance studies
argues that excessive risk aversion on the part of CEOs and other senior executives is one
of the most important and potentially most costly agency problems. In theory, shareholders
and boards, who are well aware of the significance of this agency issue, can design contracts
to mitigate executives’ risk aversion. However, in practice, the contracts designed by the
boards may not always sufficiently incentivize the executives to offset the effect of increas-
ing risk aversion during recessions. Equally, not considering the effect of lower risk aver-
sion levels during economic booms might result in managers taking excessive risks, as
evidenced in the last financial crisis.
Our research highlights the importance of the interaction between managerial incentives
and the macroeconomic environment. Boards and regulators, who design compensation
structure to curb excessive risk taking, may find it useful to consider the pro-cyclical nature
of the relationship between performance incentives and risk taking. Our results indicate
that counteracting the pro-cyclical relationship between pay-for-performance incentives
8 We thank the referee for this suggestion.
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Table X. Regressions for a subsample of low-leverage firms
This table presents the results for the estimation of Equation (2) in the text using a sub-sample
of low-leverage firms, that is, the firms that are in the lowest quartile of leverage distribution.
The dependent variable is firm risk, calculated as the logarithm of the annualized variance of
the daily stock returns. The main variable of interest is the interaction of logarithm of the lagged
value of delta with the recession measure. The definitions of the variables are provided in
Appendix A. All regressions control for year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the firm level. P-values are provided in brackets. *, **, and *** mark the 10%, 5%, and 1%
statistical significance for the estimated coefficients.
Macroeconomic
state measured by:



















Log(Delta1) 0.007 0.015 0.033 0.012 0.002 0.023
[0.417] [0.082]* [0.001]*** [0.160] [0.870] [0.052]*
Log(Vega1) 0.007 0.027 0.043 0.013 0.030 0.041
[0.547] [0.013]** [0.001]*** [0.201] [0.010]*** [0.005]***
Macroeconomy 0.268 0.263 0.233 0.110 0.116 0.106
[0.009]*** [0.006]*** [0.065]* [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Log(Delta1) *
Macroeconomic state
0.027 0.024 0.019 0.010 0.009 0.008
[0.056]* [0.075]* [0.267] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.018]**
Log(Vega1) *
Macroeconomic state
0.028 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.002
[0.037]** [0.483] [0.733] [0.032]** [0.572] [0.524]
Log(Cash compensation1) 0.079 0.047 0.041 0.090 0.051 0.043
[0.000]*** [0.088]* [0.173] [0.000]*** [0.059]* [0.151]
CEO tenure 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.003 0.001
[0.000]*** [0.258] [0.916] [0.000]*** [0.303] [0.967]
Log(Sales) 0.177 0.132 0.085 0.172 0.124 0.078
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.017]** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.026]**
Market-to-book 0.005 0.011 0.008 0.003 0.010 0.007
[0.513] [0.119] [0.332] [0.734] [0.156] [0.426]
R&D expenditures/assets 1.227 0.459 0.520 1.349 0.460 0.529
[0.000]*** [0.005]*** [0.032]** [0.000]*** [0.004]*** [0.025]**
Capital expenditures/assets 0.727 0.823 0.809 0.717 0.825 0.794
[0.010]*** [0.002]*** [0.007]*** [0.012]** [0.002]*** [0.008]***
Debt/assets 0.080 0.964 0.720 0.286 0.882 0.683
[0.881] [0.092]* [0.288] [0.610] [0.119] [0.300]
Constant 0.798 0.587 0.860 0.536 0.428 0.725
[0.004]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.042]** [0.028]** [0.001]***
N 4,930 4,930 4,443 4,930 4,930 4,443
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.577 0.540 0.524 0.582 0.547 0.532
Adjusted R-squared 0.570 0.537 0.521 0.575 0.545 0.529
Note: P-values in brackets.
*P< 0.10, **P< 0.05.
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and firm risk by providing less (more) risk-taking incentives during economic expansions
(recessions) can be beneficial.
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Appendix A.
Table AI. Variable definitions and sources
Variable Description Source
A. CEO incentive measures
Salary ($000s) Base salary of the CEO ExecuComp
Bonus ($000s) Bonus payments to the CEO. Calculated
as “Bonus þ Non-equity Incentives”
after the fiscal year 2006
ExecuComp
Cash compensation ($000) Salary plus bonus ExecuComp
Delta ($000s) Dollar change in the CEO stock and op-
tion portfolio for a 1% change in
stock price
Authors’ calculations
Vega ($000s) Dollar change in the CEO stock and op-
tion portfolio for a 1% change in
stock return volatility
Authors’ calculations
Tenure as CEO (years) Number of years as CEO ExecuComp
Long tenure An indicator variable that takes the
value one if CEO tenure is greater
than 3 years, and zero otherwise
ExecuComp
B. Risk measures
Total risk Annualized variance of daily stock re-
turns during a firm’s fiscal year
CRSP
Firm-specific risk Annualized variance of residuals from
the market model
CRSP
C. Firm financial characteristics
R&D expenditures/assets Research and development expenditures
scaled by total assets
Compustat
Capital expenditures/assets Capital expenditures net of sales of
plant, property, and equipment scaled
by total assets
Compustat
Leverage ratio Ratio of long-term debt and debt in cur-
rent liabilities to book value of assets
Compustat
Size Natural logarithm of net sales Compustat
Market value Sum of market value of common stock,
liquidating value of preferred stock,
and book value of total debt
Compustat, CRSP
Market-to-book ratio Market value divided by book value of
total assets
Compustat
Return on assets (ROA) Earnings before interest, taxes, depreci-
ation, and amortization (EBITDA)
scaled by total assets
Compustat
Stock return Annual stock return over a firm’s fiscal
year
Compustat
FAS cost Ratio of Black–Scholes value of CEO
stock option grants to net income.
This variable serves as a proxy for ac-
counting cost associated with the im-
plementation of FAS 123R
Compustat
(continued)
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Table AI. Continued
Variable Description Source
Surplus cash Ratio of cash from assets-in-place (oper-
ating activities net cash flow minus de-
preciation plus R&D expenditures) to
total assets
Compustat
Total loss carry forward An indicator variable that takes the
value one if a firm has tax-loss-carry-
forwards in any of the past 3 years
and zero otherwise
Compustat
Industry median delta The median value of delta in a firm’s in-
dustry as identified by two-digit SIC
codes
Execucomp
Industry median vega The median value of vega in a firm’s in-
dustry as identified by two-digit SIC
codes
ExecuComp
Value decline An indicator variable that takes the
value one if a firm has a negative hold-
ing period return in a fiscal year, and
zero otherwise
CRSP
HHI HHI of industry concentration Hoberg and Phillips
Data Library
D. Macroeconomic risk measures
Recession dummy An indicator variable that takes the
value one if a firm’s fiscal year corres-
ponds with 90 recession days as iden-
tified by the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) and zero
otherwise
NBER
Recession days The number of days a firm faced reces-




Advance release values for real GDP
growth rate (percentage changes from
a year ago), seasonally adjusted. We
calculate the minimum GDP growth





Additions to non-farm pay-
roll employment (NFP)
Advance release values for the change in
the non-farm payroll, seasonally ad-
justed. We calculate the minimum of
the changes in the non-farm payroll






Advance release values of the Personal
Consumption Expenditure Growth,
seasonally adjusted real values. We
calculate the minimum of the personal
expenditure growth rate over a fiscal
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Table AI. Continued
Variable Description Source
Retail sales (RS) growth rate Advance release values of growth in the
total receipts at stores that sell mer-
chandise and related services to final
consumers. We calculate the min-
imum of the personal expenditure




S&P500 volatility Volatility of the S&P 500 Index during a
firm’s fiscal year
CRSP
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